

# Introduction

## *Transpacific Studies: Critical Perspectives on an Emerging Field*

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### Transpacific Power and Knowledge

In his book *A Nostalgist's Map of America*, the late poet Agha Shahid Ali writes of his travels in what we might call the simultaneous geographies of landscape and imagination:

When on Route 80 in Ohio  
I came across an exit  
to Calcutta  
the temptation to write a poem  
led me past the exit  
so I could say  
India always exists  
off the turnpikes  
of America (Ali 1991, "In Search of Evanescence," 41)

India exists in the United States of America, and America, that mythical land, was for a moment imagined to be India. Calcutta marks a spot on the map of the real India, but it also marks a spot of the imagined India that has found its way somehow to Ohio. While the poet did not take the turnpike to see what this imagined India looked like, preserving the sense of the possibility of a real India waiting there, one could say that India did exist because of its claim on the American landscape. Likewise, one could equally conceive of roaming through India and finding bits of the real or the fantastic or the imagined USA in the alleys, streets, and off-roads. The USA there may not be the real USA to an American citizen, but it has a certain materiality to the Indian resident. Ali's poem marks a common enough experience in the relations between "America" and "Asia," two diverse entities whose cultural, economic, and political significance

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are both attached to particular countries and regions and which also exceed them, existing as imaginative constructions, discourses, and fantasies in the minds of their residents, their expatriates, and their friends and enemies elsewhere. This volume explores a model of “transpacific studies” that can illuminate the traffic in peoples, cultures, capital, and ideas between “America” and “Asia,” as well as across the troubled ocean that lends its name to this model. The “Pacific,” as many have noted, is as much of a trope and a figure as “America” or “Asia,” and no less diverse and contested. This volume is an effort to explore all three tropes in their triangulated relationship to each other, and to propose an academic field of study that can think through them simultaneously.

We begin with the idea of the Pacific as a construct that has been relevant to the peoples of Europe and America since the sixteenth century and the beginning of European exploration. The Pacific was important even earlier than this to the Asian and Pacific peoples with whom Europeans and later Americans came into contact via relationships of conquest, commerce, conversion, and collaboration.<sup>1</sup> In the European, American, and Asian imaginations, the idea of the Pacific is inseparable from fantasies of economic expansion and domination, with terms such as the Pacific Basin, the Pacific Rim, and Asia-Pacific having been created to name this strategic zone of contact. All of them have been limited in their own way, and all of them bear connotations of capitalist development.<sup>2</sup> The “transpacific” is the most recent effort at naming this contact zone. While the word itself is not new, it has attained significance recently both through intellectual efforts to theorize it and through state and corporate efforts to deploy it through the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) of twelve countries that border or are in the Pacific: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States.<sup>3</sup> Like APEC’s naming of the Asia Pacific as a space of economic cooperation (and not of conflict or colonization), the TPP signals how the ocean is not only an Asian, Pacific, and North American space of interest, but one for Latin America as well. Underlying the TPP’s agreement about the necessity of free markets and transnational corporations for the health of nations, governments, and peoples is an implicit agreement about political, military, and strategic alliances. The agreement may also include a view that the TPP is part of a U.S. effort to contain Chinese influence by building strategic friendships in the Pacific. While the contributors to Arif Dirlik’s seminal volume (Dirlik 1998) on the Pacific saw Japan as the contemporary and future competitor to the United States in 1998, the years since then have seen China’s remarkable rise and, as a result, the rapid transformation of what transpacific competition and struggle means.

The emergence of a TPP, and the state recognition of such a thing as the transpacific, lends urgency to the work of theorizing the transpacific, which we spell differently from the TPP for three reasons. First, the transpacific gestures at an already existing history and pattern of flows across the Pacific that pre-date the TPP. Second, transpacific signals an inherently critical and oftentimes oppositional approach to the economic and political visions of the partnership. Third, the transpacific gestures at the better-known model of the transatlantic. The difference between a TPP and a transpacific studies evokes the basic difference in the imagination of the Pacific that many academic studies have pointed toward. On the one hand, there is one vision of the Pacific as a space of exploration, exploitation, and expansion, advanced by European, American, and Asian powers. On the other hand, there is another vision of the Pacific as a contact zone, its history defined not only by conquest, colonialism, and conflict, but also alternate narratives of translocalism, oppositional localism (Wilson 2000), and oppositional regionalism (Dirlik 1998). From these alternate narratives comes the possibility of collaborations, alliances, and friendships between subjugated, minoritized, and marginalized peoples who might fashion a counter-hegemony to the hegemony of the United States, China, Japan, and other regional powers.

This basic bifurcation of visions stems from the root contradictions set into motion by European and American expansion into the Pacific, and informs most of the theories and ideas that we gather under the rubric of the transpacific. These theories and ideas deal with: the movements of peoples under models of diaspora, transnationalism, translocalism, and cosmopolitanism; the importance of categories such as refugees, immigrants, exiles, tourists, adoptees, war brides, undocumented migrants, trafficked people, laborers, managers, and students; the value of capitalism and labor, the conflict between classes, and the exploitation and creation of wealth and inequity; the significance of gender and sexuality to the formation of populations, the role of workers, and the imagination of nations and capital; the legacies of imperialism, militarism, and colonization, and the enduring importance of racial and national differences; and last but not least of all for us, the role of intellectuals, academics, universities, and fields of study that consider Asia, America, and the Pacific.

In essence, what these competing visions of the transpacific require is a commitment to one side or the other of a centuries-old problem: the Pacific as an arena of economic development and imperial fantasy, or the Pacific as a site of critical engagement with and evaluation of such development and fantasy. In what follows, we lay out some of the key issues and problems around the Pacific and offer some ideas for what a transpacific studies may look like. At the very least, what we hope for is the rise of transpacific studies as a different kind of

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transpacific partnership, this time between academics on both sides of the Pacific and in the Pacific. Questions about how to study transpacific relations, and their impact on academic fields of study, seem to have been more of a preoccupation for U.S. academics stricken with anxiety about the latent imperialism of U.S. academia. It is our belief, however, that there is an equally urgent need for Asian and Pacific Islander academics to theorize the transpacific and their relationship to it. In the context of the “politics of imagining Asia,” as a parallel example, Wang Hui argues that Asian intellectuals cannot (re)imagine Asia without taking into account the history of European intervention in, and construction of, Asia, which has shaped the Asian nationalisms, internationalisms, and revolutions that have produced contemporary Asian nation-states and intellectual formations. Likewise, considering the Pacific, or transpacific relations, without grappling with the way those have been shaped by European and American interventions and intellectual traditions that have influenced Asian thinking and responses would be a mistake.

This is because the idea that Pacific and Asian studies in Asia are immune from the imperial problems of U.S.-based studies is a nostalgic vision. China and Japan are nations with imperial histories in Asia and the Pacific that predate European and American involvement, and they currently have hegemonic, if not outright imperialist, interests in Asia and the Pacific. South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are regional powers in Asia and the Pacific, with a vested interest in and track record of exploiting weaker economies and nations. For all of them, academic power is a function of state power, economic power, political power, and military power in similar ways to how academic power in the United States works. With Asian universities on the rise in Asia and the world, the question of how power and knowledge are related is just as critical for Asian academics as it is for American and European ones. Transpacific studies foregrounds this relationship between power and knowledge as applied to the Pacific. As a route and a region between the United States and Asia, the Pacific, both in terms of how it has been imagined and experienced, is central to the problem of how Americans, Asians, and Pacific Islanders know themselves and each other.

### Transpacific Worlds and Histories

The study of Asia emerged through the scholarly traditions of “Orientalism,” as European scholars looked “east” to what they called the Middle East and Far East. Both of these areas are “west” of the North American continent, but it is nevertheless true that Orientalist visions influenced European and American conceptions of Asia.<sup>4</sup> Before Edward Said’s famous critique in 1978, “Oriental-

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ism” designated an academic specialization that often celebrated the literary traditions of Asia. Said (1978) argued that European scholars were not representing the Middle East but constructing it as feminine, backward, despotic, and unchanging, in ways that were complicit with colonial domination. Later scholars such as Timothy Mitchell (1988), Gauri Viswanathan (1998a, 1998b), and Ashis Nandy (2010) have shown that Orientalism was a historical process, which not only took different forms when it came to different Asian nations, but also involved an intimate relationship that implicated colonizers as well as the colonized. Going further than Said, Nandy also argues that Orientalist ideas could be a source of resistance to European domination. Just as earlier Orientalists often used positive descriptions of Asian culture to critique their own societies, those deemed Orientals could take negative stereotypes and turn them into positive attributes.

In order to focus on new ways in which Asia is linked to the Americas, however, we need to start with an understanding of how “Asia” itself has been constructed even before the Orientalist tradition. As Martin W. Lewis and Kären Wigen (1997) have shown, “Asia” as a term emerged in classical antiquity when it was used by the Greeks to denote all lands to the east of them, in contrast to Europe to the north and west and Africa to the south. The “myth of continents” was initially constructed as a triangle of land masses arrayed around a body of water, the Mediterranean, that bound them all together through a network of trade. After the new world was “discovered,” America was added, so that Victorians could speak of “the four quarters of the world,” and later of seven continents (Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, South America, Oceania, and Antarctica, although the three initial continents were in fact part of the same land mass). In effect, the European perspective treated region as a surrogate for religion and culture, demoting huge entities like China and India to “subcontinents.” The Pacific is a much larger body of water than the Mediterranean, so for many centuries it was seen primarily as a barrier to exchange, a vast watery expanse that took months to cross. Only a few daring explorers tried to sail from the Americas to Asia, and for most peoples in both Asia and the Americas, it designated a region which was literally “off the map.”<sup>5</sup> For many centuries the maritime trade networks that linked the area we now call “Asia” were focused on the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. “Asian civilizations” interacted through these networks, allowing for the spread of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism across thousands of miles and creating a relatively coherent configuration of cultural flows and the mutual adoption of new beliefs and practices.

A discourse of “Pan-Asianism” emerged during the process of decolonization, as a counter to European imperial domination. Nationalist struggles for

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self-determination built on western Orientalism to create an idea of “the East” as the inverted mirror image of “the West,” opposing mystic spirituality to bureaucratic rationalism and Asian family values and discipline to European decadence, while other abstract, essentialized notions ossified into binary contrasts. Japanese nationalists also developed a vision of “Asia led by Asians,” which served in part to camouflage their own imperial designs. As new ideological binaries divided Asia in the twentieth century, World War II gave birth to the idea of “Pacific Asia,” a major theater of war operations where American and Japanese visions of Asia conflicted. This idea of Pacific Asia extended into the Cold War era. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) became the first viable regional organization starting in 1967, and it led in 1989 to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which stressed economic interdependence more than political independence. As an attempt to coordinate regional growth and enhance economic dynamism, APEC redefined regionalism so that “what started as an effort defined mainly in Pacific terms became one in which the Asian element would grow to be the more prominent one” (Acharya 2010, 1010).

This shift from the Pacific to Asia became evident with the dramatic growth of the East Asian economies of Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore in the 1990s. Their rise laid the groundwork for ideas of seemingly exceptional “Asian values” that could lead the coming Pacific century. Drawing on a perceived commonality derived from Confucianism’s ethical and theological planes, the proponents of “Asian values” argued that even secular Asian societies were deeply invested in core principles of discipline, thrift, and respect for education and authority. In this century, these proponents tied the idea of a “rising Asia” to the expanding economies of China and India. Instead of speaking of Asia’s emancipation from the West in spiritual and moral terms, advocates of a “rising Asia” deploy a language that is predominantly one of commercial expansion and globalization. However, as several chapters in this volume show (Xiang, Lin, and Yeoh), this “rising Asia” is increasingly imitating and interacting with the United States and other nations on the opposite side of the Pacific. As Wang Hui (2011, ch. 1) argues, the turn to essentializing notions of culture on the part of some advocates for rising Asian nation-states obscures the heterogeneity of Asian societies, and problematically affirms a discourse of nation-states that Asia has inherited from the west.

Recent debates about a resurgent Asia also reveal how much the idea of “Asia” is an emergent reality that is not territorially limited to the Asian side of the Pacific but also resurgent within American public life (see Andaya 2010 and Duara 2010). Prasenjit Duara (2010) argues that the ways in which “regions” and “regionalism” are conceived tends to follow dominant modes of “spatial

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production” in a particular period of time. The twentieth century was a time when the nation and the idea of national culture was predominant, but in the twenty-first century we may be moving to a period that will emphasize other linkages, connections, and transnational processes. We see the transpacific as one of those “spaces of interaction,” which is not itself a “region” (and does not compete with a new notion of Asian interactions) but which does define flows of culture and capital across the ocean. As scholars like Fernand Braudel (1996) could speak of a “Mediterranean world” in the sixteenth century, it is possible that scholars of the twenty-second century will speak of a “transpacific world” that emerged in the twenty-first century around networks of trade, defining flows of both culture and capital across a different body of water.

The most explicit of the arguments in relationship to the Pacific are found in Dirlik’s *What Is in a Rim?* (1998), to which this book is something of a sequel. The essayists in Dirlik’s book, led by Dirlik himself, take a critical stance on what were the then-dominant terms for discussing the Pacific as a space of capital flows, “Asia-Pacific” or the “Pacific Rim” (Dirlik 1998, Dirlik 1994, 1998; Cumings 1998). The notion of the “Pacific Rim” became a geographic term that anticipated an optimistic future zone of cooperation—a Pacific Rim discourse, as Chris Connery (1994) calls it, of a euphoric regional ideology that focused on rapid economic growth and paid little attention to those who were excluded from or paid the cost of this expansion of transnational commerce. Dirlik (1998) traces the genealogy of “Pacific Rim” to European and American colonial influence and argues that the idea of the Pacific is “a discourse that seeks to construct what is pretended to be its point of departure” (4). This discourse defines the contours of a physical space that it claims only to describe.

Pacific Rim discourse celebrated the “miracles” performed by “tigers” (newly industrialized countries that soared into affluence), and neglected the other countries more appropriately described as “water buffaloes” (still trudging through the mud of rural economies and mired in poverty). By shedding light on these Asian success stories, the concept of the Pacific Rim helped its advocates erase the memory of America’s three decades of war in Korea and Indochina, where it fought wars ostensibly to contain Communism but also to advance the development of capitalism in the rest of East and Southeast Asia, notably in Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, the American war in Indochina was supported by Japan, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, who provided bases, soldiers, contractors, and supplies for the American war effort. The regional and global significance of this was also evidenced by how the North Vietnamese were supported by China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea, while Laos and Cambodia were eventually dragged into the conflict. The American war in Indochina also left a legacy of violence and displacement for the

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people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, many of whom fled across the Pacific to other countries. Through a transpacific framework, we can see how the American war was not simply a military or political event involving a few countries, but was actually part of larger strategies of economic maneuvering in which the future Asian powers of the Pacific Rim played a key part.

The central place of the Pacific in the global imagination and maneuverings of powerful and not-so-powerful nations encourages a reenvisioning of U.S. history. In spite of a dominant Atlantic origin story linking Americans to Britain and the rest of Europe, Asia has influenced American culture very deeply (Cumings 2009, x). This rhetoric of American and Pacific centuries implicitly praises the economic potential of the United States and powerhouse Asian countries, with cultural potential a distant second and the Pacific Islands largely absent. The economic globalization that is driven by the United States, Europe, and Asia, which is designed to reinforce the economic superiority of already industrialized countries and to suppress the competitive ability of already poor countries, is supplemented by militarism. While the United States, with its overwhelming and potentially self-crippling military budget, is the military enforcer of U.S.-dominated global capitalism, Asian militarism is on the rise as a consequence of an emboldened China and a weakening United States.<sup>6</sup> Thus, even if the “American century” that U.S. force produced may be giving way to a “Pacific century,” both are also trademark names labeling the dominant forces of globalization in particular eras. Thus, “transpacific” inevitably carries connotations of economic growth, development, exploitation, and hierarchy, along regional, national, racial, class, and gender lines.

Although the transpacific can be conceived as a complex network of actually realized power and domination among many countries, codified in treaties, organizations, and formal alliances, the latent possibility of opposition, resistance, and counterhegemonic thinking is also to be found, dispersed among many populations and locales. We could look at efforts to build oppositional thinking in the Pacific as well as across the Pacific to other locales. Working from the legacies of scholarship on the Black Atlantic, other scholars have excavated “Afro-Asian intersections” that serve to link both Atlantic and Pacific, as well as black, yellow, and brown peoples. Ho Chi Minh, for example, sought to build anticolonial efforts by forging alliances between Africans and Vietnamese in France between the world wars; W. E. B. DuBois and Richard Wright looked to China and India for inspiration; Africans and South Asians found commonality not in race or national identity, but in commitments to emancipation; some African Americans during World War II were inspired by Japanese rhetoric of anti-imperialism. Afro-Asian revolutionary solidarity was also expressed at the 1955 Bandung Conference, in professions of Third World

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alliance against colonialism and imperialism, and in efforts to link domestic struggles with international struggles. All of these were inflected by transpacific notions of resistance carried out by minoritized and colonized partners.<sup>7</sup> A transpacific perspective serves as a counterpoint or balance to transatlantic orientations, lending more credence to the role that the Pacific and Asia have played in shaping the United States and Europe.

For Asia, Wang Hui (2011) locates that latent possibility in the history of decolonization and national liberation, whose memories remain even in a “depoliticized” era of Asian nation-states grasping for capitalist power (41). Other latent possibilities reside in what Epeli Hau’ofa (1995) calls “Oceania” and “our sea of islands,” his terms for how to reimagine what Europeans called the Pacific, from the points of view of those who live in the islands and the ocean. “The world of Oceania is not small,” he writes in defiance of colonial ideas that the islands in the ocean—and their peoples—were inconsequential. “It is huge and growing bigger every day” (Hau’ofa 1995, 89). The voices and perspectives of Pacific peoples foreground campaigns for sovereignty and indigenous rights, and critiques of nuclear testing, environmental destruction, and the imperialist nature of tourism, as in the work of indigenous activists like Haunani-Kay Trask. Tourism in Hawai‘i and elsewhere, it should be noted, is no longer a western-dominated phenomenon but increasingly a vehicle for Asian cosmopolitanism in the transpacific, expressive of the rise of Asian capital in internationally powerful and regionally powerful Asian states. Critiques like Wang Hui’s of Asia, therefore, need to incorporate an awareness of the Pacific in order to understand how Asian memories of liberation and decolonization may efface efforts by some contemporary Asian peoples to colonize weaker others.

While the peoples of the Pacific bear memories and histories that speak against the “militarized currents” imposed on them, the transpacific legacies of anticolonial wars and intra-Asian wars remain bitter and strong throughout Asia and its diasporas (see Shigematsu and Camacho 2010). The transpacific desires of Europe and the United States led directly to the imposition of colonial authority or the infringement of sovereignty on numerous Asian countries, including incursions into Japan and China, the American colonization of the Philippines, the French colonization of Indochina, and the contemporary “transnational garrison state” extended by the United States through its military bases around the world (Bello 2010, 311). Asian nations were not immune from the impulse to dominate, interfere in, and influence other countries, first their neighbors and increasingly countries further away on the Pacific Rim. Twentieth-century examples include the Japanese colonization of Korea and Manchuria, as well as Japan’s occupation of the Philippines and numerous Pacific islands, the South Korean military participation in the United States’

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Vietnam War, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979. These events illustrate how Asian nations, no matter their victimization by foreign powers, were quite capable of and willing to assume mantles of power as they sought to exercise control over one portion, or even the entirety, of the Pacific. In the last few decades, Asian countries have also tried to extend their influence through trade and investment, as evident in Japanese, Taiwanese, and South Korean firms opening plants in Mexico and developing economic relations with Latin America; China's efforts to expand mining, drilling and trade in Africa; and all the major Asian countries jostling for influence over weaker Asian countries in East and Southeast Asia.

The transpacific is thus defined by deep contemporary and historical conflicts over geography, economy, and political spheres of influence that prevent any one country from claiming moral superiority or insisting, without problem, on centering itself in a transpacific discourse. These conflicts have also produced vast and continuing movements of people between Asian countries, across the Pacific, and between Asia and the Americas that we can examine through concepts of diaspora and transnationalism.

### **Transpacific Dispersals and (Re)Productions**

Even though diaspora and transnationalism deal with dispersed populations across national borders, they are often themselves defined in terms of national or ethnic origins. As a consequence, diasporic and transnational populations can reaffirm problematic nationalist or racial notions, and can also be sources of nationalist fervor rather than postnational openness (see Palumbo-Liu 2007). Nevertheless, diasporic and transnational frameworks are necessary to explore relations among the adopted home, the ethnic homeland, and geographically dispersed coethnics. These relations are sometimes imagined as stemming from or leading to loss, as Agha Shahid Ali (1991) alludes to when he mentions that “cluster of sorrows / that haunt the survivors of Dispersal that country / which has no map” (44). This “country which has no map” is the imaginary cartography of homeland and dispersal that immigrants, refugees, and exiles carry with them in their minds and their souls, but it is not always and only a landscape of loss and sorrow, populated by the most ephemeral of all transpacific migrants, the ghosts that have managed to cross an ocean.<sup>8</sup> These Asian diasporas have also become fused with notions of communities that transcend geographic dispersal, which could provide a perhaps utopian sense of “belonging” without the burdens, limits, and responsibilities of citizenship. The two possible senses of of Asian diasporas as dystopic and utopic demarcate the extreme ends of different ways in which diasporas can be deployed.

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Diaspora in its contemporary sense examines the shifting relations between homelands and host nations from the perspective of those who have moved, some voluntarily and many against their will. The scholarly literature has often defined such movements of displaced peoples as the opposite of “indigenous culture,” but these two opposed and mutually illuminating concepts have been radically modified by New World settler colonies, the process of colonization, and a globalizing economy in which “indigenous peoples” are most often the most displaced. Furthermore, as Rhacel Parreñas and Lok Siu (2007) argue, diasporas are not simply bilateral phenomenon between two countries. Ethnically defined diasporas are scattered across multiple countries, while single countries host multiple diasporas; a diasporic-oriented studies thus needs to look at the ways diasporas may reaffirm ethnic and nationalist notions of monoculturalism but can also serve as nodes of alliances with other displaced or dispersed peoples.

Transnationalism, on the other hand, encompasses not just the movement of people, but also ideas of citizenship, technology, multinational governance, modes of political organization, differing notions of sovereignty, and market impulses, all combining to shape the contemporary world. While we could speak of “major” transnationalisms that involve the movement of capital or the elite populations that serve it or are served by it, Françoise Lionnet and Shu-mei Shih (2005) draw attention to the phenomenon of “minor” transnationalisms that are composed of minority peoples who move across borders. Rather than focus on the vertical relationship between majority and minority in a given society, they emphasize the horizontal relationships of a minority population across national borders and between minorities within national borders. Like the diasporic model of Parreñas and Siu, minor transnationalism affirms the political possibilities of relationships between disempowered, marginalized, and minoritized peoples.

While many may see diasporic and transnational dispersals as burdens born by displaced persons, we also see them as “spatial resources” capable of exploitation by both the powerful and the less powerful. These spatial resources create international networks for organizing the movements of people and goods in the contemporary world (business networks, religious congregations, communities of readers and of consumers of media in a specific language, etc.). Asians and Pacific Islanders have crossed the seas to become citizens of many countries, while western citizens have gone abroad in Asia for work and study. Asian powers have accrued economic influence in the Pacific Islands and the west, while many Asians have gone to work or settled in other Asian countries, developing diasporic networks in which the United States or European countries are not central nodes. Some of these Asian countries compete with the United States

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and Europe for influence and profit and deploy various strategies to manage mobile and minority populations. A transpacific framework prevents any easy shift to foregrounding rising Asian countries without considering how they are implicated in problems of power, and how their rise is tied to a complicated history of competition, conflict, and negotiation with the west, with each other, and with their own minorities. Examining the complex web of personal identities, motivated journeys, pilgrimages, returns and remigrations between Asian countries and across the Pacific allows us to envisage a complex new set of relationships that tie one nation to another, and new sets of relationships based on heritage which may be even stronger than those of nation and citizenship.

The transpacific connections which forge diasporas are not simply a matter of subjective identification, however. They emerge in particular social and material conditions that produce, sustain, and perpetuate diasporic formations. The transpacific offers a framework to explore ties between the ethnic homeland, the adopted home of present residence, and “ethnoscapes,” or geographically dispersed coalitions of coethnics (see Appadurai 1996). In this sense, the idea of the transpacific is an intellectual and political project as well as an aspect of modern life in the twenty-first century. Calling the twenty-first century the “Pacific century” or the “Asian century” indicates not just a shifting of power but also a change of tactics, with the emphasis less on a single geographic center and more on a complex network of connections. These diasporic connections are not indiscriminately “global” but culturally specific, composed of fragmented, multiple connections emerging from historically particular conditions. Many Asian states now do a great deal to produce and sustain diasporic connections, in order to promote investment, bring in educated technical advisors with homeland ties, and so on. They are following an example perhaps best modeled by Israel (the realization of a diasporic dream of re-creating a homeland as a nation-state) but now common throughout Asia (although less common for Europe). But as diasporas have emerged due to massive migrations, displacements of refugees and re-drawing of national boundaries, they have destabilized notions of sovereignty and autonomy, unsettling the clearer geographies of past centuries. In Arjun Appadurai’s (1996) words, “State and nation are at each other’s throats, and the hyphen that connects them is now less an icon of conjuncture than an index of disjuncture” (38).

Within the diaspora, it is sometimes easier to feel passionate loyalty and attachment to an imagined homeland that is geographically distant than to reconcile with the imperfect origin that one can eventually revisit. The idea of diaspora’s powerful emotional pull lies in its appeal to shared—and imagined—history and experiences, which can be of a positive, celebratory nature or can be constituted by the shared suffering of war, forced migration, and the exploi-

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tation of labor, bodies, and sexualities. These common experiences create a sense of “being a people” with deep-reaching roots and destinies outside the time/space of the host nation. Rather than seeing themselves as “ethnic minorities,” displaced by suffering, exile, and discrimination, diasporic groups may prefer to see themselves as “transnational subjects” whose affiliations cannot be contained within nation-state boundaries. In Paul Gilroy’s (2000) postracial vision, diasporic potential arises from the diasporic place “in between” opposing “camps,” which are both nation-states but also rigid ideological, economic, and political forces; “in between,” these diasporic populations and their related transnational kin see themselves as possessing greater flexibility in identity than their more nationally, communally, or ethnically bound peers. Thus, the concept of the transpacific not only involves trauma, haunting, and marginalization but also empowerment, enrichment, and expansion.

The celebratory potential of transpacific communities, cultures, and circulations needs to be contrasted, however, with both the histories of conflict and colonization outlined above and with the vulnerability of transpacific populations to cooptation. Minority cultures and identities can become what Inderpal Grewal (2005) calls “lifestyles of empowerment” (16). These lifestyles are based on histories of political struggle against marginalization and persecution that have resulted in the formation of necessary identities, such as “Asian American” or “feminist,” that are nevertheless subject to participating in neoliberal and nationalist discourses. U.S. liberal feminism, then, while affirming women’s rights, can also use them, inadvertently or deliberately, to reinforce the power of First World nations over others. The classic formulation of this is in Gayatri Spivak’s depiction of colonialism as “white men saving brown women from brown men,” modulated in this case to include white women (and their diasporic women of color allies) as rescuers of downtrodden women globally (see Shih 2005). The function of transpacific minorities as neoliberal subjects in the west is also apparent, as multiculturalism, diversity, and tolerance, in all their national variations in the west, promote the inclusion of racial and sexual minorities not just to address inequality but to advance the idea of western superiority over darker countries and cultures that are supposedly not so tolerant. In his celebrated treatise on cosmopolitanism, where he argues for the necessity of empathy-building conversation with strangers across different cultures, Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006) notes, rather darkly, that “there are limits to cosmopolitan tolerance. . . . we will not stop with conversation. Toleration requires a concept of the intolerable” (144).

How cosmopolitan societies will respond to noncosmopolitan societies in Appiah’s model is left unstated, which is perhaps one sign of how neoliberalism operates: the welcoming hand that is offered to lift up the other can easily turn

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into the clenched fist if that hand is refused. Racial minorities who function as the “stranger” within western society, and whose acceptance validates western cosmopolitanism, run the risk of being literally domesticated. By focusing only on domestic issues of inequality and inclusion, or by celebrating their status as cultural ambassadors and translators between East and West or North and South, racial minorities in the west obscure the link between their relative privilege as western subjects vis-à-vis the countries that the west dominates. They thus participate in what Gilroy (2006) calls “armored cosmopolitanism,” the reworking of the old idea of the white man’s burden for a multicultural, neoliberal present in which Asian countries who aspire to global and regional power also participate (60). While most of the discussion on cosmopolitanism and neoliberalism has focused on western majorities as their subjects, minorities and nonwestern majorities also need to be located in these discourses, particularly as countries like China, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore, as well as their diasporas, all cultivate their own politically complicated versions of Asian cosmopolitanism and neoliberalism.

South Korea provides one example of how a poor country has turned itself into a “subimperial” one whose features include armored cosmopolitanism, neoliberal influence, and diasporic power.<sup>9</sup> This transformation is depicted in Seoul’s War Memorial, a museum whose historical narrative shows South Korea being born in agonized struggle from the Korean War, when it was helped by the United States and the United Nations. The culmination of the narrative depicts a strong South Korea that in turn helps defend the freedom of other countries in humanitarian operations. This is a euphemism for war, with the conflict in this case being the Vietnam War in which South Korean forces participated as the United States’ strongest ally (and, according to many reports, its cruelest).<sup>10</sup> The so-called humanitarian aid offered by South Korea in Vietnam was, in effect, a reworking of the white man’s burden as the yellow man’s burden, for South Korea benefited immensely from its participation in American neocolonialism; some historians credit American payments for South Korean troops and American contracts to South Korean corporations as responsible for igniting South Korea’s economic development (see Woo 1991).

This development would eventually have further transpacific ramifications with South Korean investment in the United States, where Korean capital has elevated Los Angeles’s Koreatown from ethnic ghetto to capitalist enclave. This transformation cannot simply be celebrated, for in Los Angeles we see one of the more spectacular examples of the oppressive side of “Afro-Asian intersections.” In a racially divided city where black ghettos endure, transpacific Asian populations, including but not limited to Koreans, benefit not only from positive images attached to their economic success and cosmopolitan style, but also

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arguably from the negative “virtue” of not being black. Studies of the transpacific should therefore be conscious about how diasporic populations cannot be considered in isolation, but must be considered in relation to other diasporas and domestic minorities in networks of affiliation and disaffiliation, of alliance and exploitation, of cooperation and conflict.

Lastly, we can consider how the erotic, the romantic, and the heteronormative all play a role in the imagination of countries and peoples competing in and over the Pacific. As Neferti Tadiar says, desire and capitalism are inseparable, and the relations and identities of transpacific nations can be seen as “libidinal economies” where the pursuit of profit is imagined through romantic, erotic, sexual, and gendered ways. Thus, globalization depends on feminized labor to staff low-wage factories, to fulfill domestic work, and to service sexual needs; often, this feminized labor comes from Asia or the Pacific, or from Asian diasporic populations (see also Parreñas 2001 and Gerefi 1998). While in the American century it was the United States as a masculine presence that dominated the world, particularly a feminized Asia, in the Asian century it is the stronger Asian powers who seek to appropriate the masculine position, often at the expense of weaker Asian and Pacific countries. Asian cultures and countries themselves participate in different ways in this figurative, cultural, and economic exploitation of labor, from being complicit in the use and export of feminized labor to propagating notions of women as being representatives of a country’s pure, national essence. It is because of this that Naoki Sakai and Hyon Joo Yoo argue that a “transpacific imaginary” recognizes a “transpacific complicity” in the imperial struggle for power in the Pacific. They point out how the United States and Japan traded dominant positions in the Pacific after World War II, and how both Japan and the United States helped to justify Japan’s post-war role as the assistant to and beneficiary of U.S. hegemony via a deeply a gendered discourse. At the same time, Japan exercises a will to domination in relation to other Asian countries, symbolized for Sakai and Yoo in its treatment of Korean comfort women.<sup>11</sup>

In a variety of discourses, from the academic to the military to the literary to the cinematic to the journalistic, the relationship between colonizer and colonized has been depicted by both east and west as a figurative and literal heterosexual rape, between a masculine west or north and a feminine east or south. If not rape, then this relationship is often seen as a heterosexual and sometimes homosexual romance. While rape is destructive and exploitative, romance is progressive and productive. Both are capable of offspring, the results of miscegenation that can be monstrous or beautiful, standing in as figures for why foreign cultures should never meet or why they should for a more peaceful and prosperous future. The notion of economic wealth as being a part of exploitation or

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production is always intertwined with rape and romance, and since the economic and the erotic mutually animate each other, queer studies can play a role in disrupting the heteronormative assumptions of transpacific productivity and reproductiveness. Lee Edelman's argument that political discourses are built on a futuristic orientation premised on the inevitability and fetishization of children, reproduction, and the heterosexual family has some resonance for economic discourses of the Pacific. These discourses are predicated on the idea that what Masao Miyoshi calls a "borderless world" for free trade and capitalism will inevitably lead to wealth and riches that can be passed on to future generations (who are both the beneficiaries and the justification for capitalism).

To refuse reproduction and to refuse capitalist production are both queer behaviors in the capitalist worlds of the transpacific. The work that brings together both queer studies and diasporic studies makes evident how diasporas and transnational populations often see themselves not only in capitalist terms of progress and upward mobility but also in terms of the heterosexual reproduction of national cultures. Queer diasporas, then, disrupt the easy transference of romantic, heterosexual metaphors of capital and nations onto the diaspora, and vice versa, such as the marriage of east and west, the inevitability of second generations, the fertile soil of new lands, and so on. Queerness also reconfigures how we understand the mobility of populations. As Nayan Shah argues, the factors that stimulate transnational, border-crossing movements are often considered by scholars to be economic or political in nature. But what would happen if sexual, erotic, or other social factors were considered? Perhaps, he argues, men moved because they were escaping social and sexual constrictions, rather than only or primarily economic limitations. While Shah focuses on the intimate worlds of male migrants and the "stranger intimacy" they formed with other men, such a queer perspective can be extended to women as well. A queer diaspora as an analytic deflates the idea that people were leaving "home," for perhaps they did not consider where they left to be a home for them, as Gayatri Gopinath points out. Transpacific frameworks that include the insights of queer perspectives unsettle many of the economic, reproductive, nationalist, and culturalist assumptions that power capitalist visions and fantasies of a "Trans-Pacific Partnership," as well as the impulses within academic fields to "settle" into and for disciplinary homes.

### **Toward a Transpacific Studies**

The challenge of transpacific histories and flows means that existing models for studying these topics need to be reconsidered and reconfigured. This is true not only for the west and its universities, but also for Asia and its increasingly

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powerful and competitive academic complex. In the west, the transpacific has usually been studied under area studies and increasingly in related fields like Asian American studies and American studies, as part of what John Rowe (2012) calls a “scholarly state apparatus” (87). Asian scholars in Asia who also study Asia reasonably look with suspicion on both the western area studies tradition and its debates about the complications of area studies, as well as the nationalist assumptions of U.S.-based Asian American and American studies. But the field questions and methodological problems that U.S.-based scholars have been discussing also have relevance for Asian-based scholars, for the academic industrial complex within which U.S. scholars work has trained many Asian scholars and is also being adopted by Asian countries. For these reasons, Asian and Pacific scholars’ efforts to distinguish their own work on Asia, the Pacific, and the transpacific, or insurgent calls for Pacific studies, or Asian efforts to study the west, are not immune from some of the issues that have shaped U.S.-based fields and produced American blind spots. Transpacific studies, built on multilateral relationships and staged in multiple countries, allows a reconsideration of dominant U.S.-based fields and emergent or competing Asian- and Pacific-based fields.

The legacies of Orientalism and the critique of the oftentimes compromised position of postcolonial intellectuals provide openings for how to consider the role of transpacific studies and its impact on the fields that study Asia, the Pacific, Europe, or the United States, regardless of where they are based. Scholars in Asia who also study Asia have argued that the United States and Europe should be considered as regions of thought rather than being the centers of universal theory, from where scholars venture from home out into the “field” of Asia (see Harootunian 2002 and C. Lowe 2007). Thus, not only should Europe be provincialized, as Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) proposes, but the United States as well. “The travels of academic theory in Southeast Asia suggest the provincial nature of American critical theory,” Celia Lowe (2007) says. “What might it look like for U.S.-based scholars to proceed as though they do not possess the most significant knowledge about, or all of the solutions to, the world’s difficult problems?” (C. Lowe 2007, 133 and 121). The humbling of U.S. area studies is necessary in any post-Orientalist approach to the study of Asia, but if the U.S. university must be located in relation to the history of U.S. power, so do Asian universities need to be located in relation to the histories of Asian power. In a larger frame, Wang Hui (2011) argues that the intellectual and political efforts to imagine a new “Asia” from within Asia can only do so through a critique of the “Europe” that constructed “Asia” in the first place. Such efforts are inevitably intertwined with the how Asian nation-states shape their scholarly apparatuses.

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While Wang Hui (2011) bases his concerns in the importance of European thinking about Asia, we argue that American ways of thinking about Asia remain important to Asian intellectuals because of continuing U.S. global dominance and the ongoing influence that the United States has within many Asian countries. Looking at the American example, we find that the problems in how the United States has examined and constructed Asia cannot be contained within Asian studies, but affect U.S. American studies and Asian American studies as well. Both of these fields have some bearing on academic studies of Asians in Asia and American influence in Asia. U.S.-based area studies and American studies came into being to serve the globalization of the United States in the mid-twentieth century. Area studies in the United States began shortly after World War II, when federal funds were allocated to increase American knowledge of world areas to improve the conduct of U.S. policy. Domestically, American studies promoted the idea of American exceptionalism. Cold War politics drove much of these fields' scholarship and program building. The links to national security concerns helped to secure funding, and that funding was later supplemented by governments and foundations in the wealthier Asian nations (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) as well as diasporic communities within the United States. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, area studies had entered a period of crisis. While some argued that traditional regional boundaries no longer seemed capable of encompassing global phenomena, others defended area studies scholarship as a dynamic, productive, and heterogeneous model that might work best when pairing and comparing insider and outsider knowledge.<sup>12</sup>

Not until the 1990s would American studies in the United States start to pay attention to the issue of U.S. domination in the Pacific as an imperial exercise, a transnational turn that would accelerate dramatically in the aftermath of 9/11. This transnational turn occurred after the multicultural turn in U.S. American studies, which began in earnest with the end of the Cold War. The moment of multicultural dominance in American studies, where the field increasingly focused on questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality within American borders, highlighted internal differences but generally overlooked the United States' role overseas or in foreign countries. The exception was the attention paid to immigration from other countries, and the gradual increase in concepts like diaspora and transnationalism. Asian American studies had always paid attention to immigration, concerned as it was in the 1960s and 1970s with how Asians arrived in the United States and how they transformed themselves into Asian Americans. Asian American studies is an intellectual formation born from the Asian American movement of the 1960s, which was premised on antiracism and anti-imperialism, fueled by the anti-Vietnam War

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movement and predicated on the radical liberation of racially and class-oppressed populations. The Asian American movement was a reaction against the political order that had given birth to area studies and American studies, and while Asian American studies has sought to be included in American studies, it has had a tense relationship with area studies, particularly Asian studies. This reflects Asian American studies' hesitation in turning toward and across the Pacific.<sup>13</sup>

Asian American studies' historical focus on immigration, with the United States as the destination, meant that Asian American studies was generally reluctant to consider the importance of Asia or countries of origin. Throughout the end of the twentieth century, Asian American studies was focused mostly on issues within American borders. But its concern with immigration meant that it was at least conscious of the role of the United States overseas in the Asian wars that created the conditions of immigration for many populations. Transpacific history was already a structuring factor in the constitution of Asian American populations, but Asian American studies neglected the transpacific nature of these populations because of its imperative to "claim America," in Maxine Hong Kingston's words. Claiming America was a direct reaction to the American tendency to see Asian Americans as perpetual foreigners. This domestic focus meant that Asian American studies was harmonious with American studies in maintaining the importance of national borders and in leaving the dominance of "America" as a categorical definition for American studies uncontested. The critique of American inequality that was fundamental to Asian American studies was, in the end, possibly even complicit with even the most exceptionalist versions of American studies, for what remained affirmed was the importance of perfecting the American democratic project.

But latent within the formation of both Asian American populations and Asian American studies were legacies of warfare and the movement of capital that would be conducive to a transpacific approach, and indeed would necessitate such an approach. Coincident with U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Asian American studies increasingly turned its attention overseas. Part of this attention focused on the American wars in Asia that had stimulated Asian emigration and which had provided the initial impetus for Asian American self-formation. Part of the attention went to a transpacific examination of the immigration experience that was as concerned with the sending countries as the receiving ones. Not least of all, some of the attention went to the diasporic and transnational contexts for understanding elements of the Asian American experience, such as the gendered and sexualized dimensions of Asian American cultures, or the popular cultural connections between Asia and Asian America.

Despite these shifts, Asian American studies still finds itself enmeshed in a problem that captured American studies as well in its transnational turn, namely the reliance on an American or Eurocentric point of view. Thus, even as Asian American and American studies stressed the diasporic, the transnational, or the international, and even as they foregrounded American imperialism, both formations tended to rely on European and American theories and centered the United States in relation to Asia or elsewhere. Not least, these studies also often depend on English or European languages, which can distort their objects of study; thus, American and Asian American studies in the United States often means the study of English-speaking and English-writing populations, whose viewpoints may be rather different than immigrants, refugees, exiles, and intellectuals who express themselves in other languages. The result of this reliance on the English language and on American or European theories and perspectives, some critics argued, was to reassert American and Asian American intellectual dominance in the name of criticizing American political, economic, and cultural dominance. Such a contradiction meant that it was possible that the questions and conclusions reached by American and Asian American studies might already be biased or flawed from the beginning by assumptions that placed certain topics or questions out of the intellectual or linguistic frame. Without a transpacific approach, then, even a post-Cold War, anti-imperialist American studies could assert either an intellectual imperialism or an insistence on the United States as the primary object of inquiry. Asian American studies also finds itself in a problematic situation vis-à-vis a latent investment in American nationalism that remains invisible without a transpacific approach.

Critiques from Asia and the Pacific about the limits of U.S.- or European-based perspectives, and the need for perspectives from Asia and the Pacific, therefore have urgency both for their practitioners and those reading from elsewhere. These critiques express a healthy skepticism toward U.S.- or European-based perspectives, from which transpacific studies itself may come. These critiques prioritize Asia as an object of inquiry and as the source of theories and ideas appropriate to such an object, which is inseparable from a wider political project about contesting and controlling the production of knowledge, its location in universities that are a part of nation-states, and the enmeshment of those nation-states in histories of colonialism and capitalism. One such critique is found in Ariel Heryanto's influential essay "Can There Be Southeast Asians in Southeast Asian Studies?" (2007). His essay has wider implications beyond Southeast Asia, and poses a provocative question with mixed answers. Southeast Asian scholars have not been influential in Southeast Asian studies due to the dominance of American and European academics. Western univer-

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sities, programs, and discourses simply overshadowed Southeast Asian ones, and western discourse became the legitimizing one in a global academic conversation. Heryanto insists that Southeast Asians can study Southeast Asians, and that such a move can be destabilizing to area and Asian studies, with native scholars speaking back to the western scholars, appropriating the knowledge formation of which their population has served primarily as objects rather than subjects.

On the one hand, Heryanto's argument can be extended widely to the issue of whether there can be Asians in Asian studies; on the other hand, his argument can also be used to emphasize the still-subordinated place of Southeast Asians relative not only to Europeans and Americans but to East Asians. In either scenario, the shifting and uneven dynamics of power and knowledge are evident. The rise of prominent Asian scholars from Asia who study Asia is dependent at least partially on the rise of the Asian countries from which they come, China and Japan, and their ability to send students to the west in order, ironically, to become equipped and recognized to study the rest. Economic and political power leads to the ability to claim academic legitimacy, and to contest the terms of academic legitimacy. But competing for academic power and knowledge is hardly a simple matter of saying that it is now possible for Asians to study Asians, as if Asians were a homogenous population. Hence, Heryanto's Southeast Asian focus is key, for it indicates the relative lack of visibility of Southeast Asian studies and scholars even as (East) Asian studies became a necessity with the rise of China and Japan. Southeast Asians must struggle for self-determination in the realm of power and knowledge against both western and East Asian countries with a more developed "scholarly state apparatus."<sup>14</sup> The deployment of theoretical instruments of power-knowledge that are of western origin or influence enforces inequalities within Asian scholarship, since access to this intellectual language is still heavily weighted toward East Asian countries and their universities and scholars.

Recognizing the uneven terrain within Asia, and in regards to Asia and the west, Kuan-Hsing Chen argues for reimagining Asia through what he calls "Asia as method," whereby Asians study Asia and Asians, from Asian locations, and within an Asian context that foregrounds the relations between Asians and Asian countries. Chen argues that "Asia as method" is a decolonizing movement, illuminating how western colonialism has not ended in Asia, but has been succeeded by the neocolonialism of global capitalism in which western countries dominate—particularly the United States—but wherein rising Asian powers and elites enthusiastically participate. Part of the result of U.S. domination is the "Americanization" of the Asian countries, particularly South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, whose intellectual, political, and military classes are deep

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under American sway. “Asia as method” also acknowledges the existence of these powerful Asian countries as “subempires” which are themselves intent on competing with each other for regional influence over the weaker countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific. “Asia as method” provides an alternative to the “politics of imagining Asia” offered by Wang Hui, offering the possibility of an “Asia” that is not beholden to the west. For Asian studies scholars who seek to wrest the meaning of “Asia” away from the west, and to create spaces for less privileged and less translated voices, “Asia as method” has proven inspiring and influential.<sup>15</sup>

“Asia as method” is the Asian counterpart of the radical oppositional method that is supposedly animates Asian American studies, which is not surprising, given their intertwined genealogies of origin. “Asia as method” derives from histories of Asian nationalisms and revolutions that were at least partially influenced by European Enlightenment ideas of nation-states and Marxism. Chen, a U.S.-trained scholar of cultural studies, is located at least partially in that European tradition as it was realized in the contemporary United States, which was shaped by domestic insurgencies on the part of American minorities. That same history of domestic insurgency and European ideas about freedom and rights, along with the inspiring example of mid-century Asian revolutions, shaped the Asian American movement and Asian American studies. Despite their shared intellectual and political histories, whether or not “Asia as method” and Asian American studies can be reconciled or partnered through a transpacific approach is an open question, given Asian American studies’ relative reluctance to deal with Asia and the silence of “Asia as method” toward Asian Americans or even Asian diasporas. In addition, both Asian American studies and “Asia as method” share some problems. Practicing “Asia as method,” like practicing Asian American studies as method, requires operating within and through a western or westernized university that is corporate and instrumental. In this university, knowledge may be critical of power but is also shaped by it as well. In addition, as Asian American studies has based much of its theoretical work on East Asian populations, so does the prioritization of East Asians presumably affect “Asia as method.” Even being critical of East Asian “subempires” can inadvertently center East Asians as the primary agents in Asia and the Pacific, including in matters of knowledge production. Lastly, “Asia as method” is the mirror image of “claiming America” that was dominant in Asian American studies. In this case the imperative is to “claim Asia,” which is an appropriation of the idea of “Asia” that was created by Europe. As “claiming America” led Asian American studies to neglect international and transnational dimensions that shaped Asian Americans, so does “Asia as method” neglect the heterogeneity of the United States and the west. By doing so, “Asia as method”

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disregards the internal differences within the United States or other western countries that have led to radical movements of political and intellectual opposition and inadvertently relegates dissident western minorities to a subordinate position both within the west and vis-à-vis the rest.

Prioritizing “Asia as method” and/or Asian American studies both run the risk of continuing to affirm the nation-state, its university, and the discourse of power-knowledge in which “minority” or “dissident” academics and fields are allowed to grow. This is evident in the way that the Pacific has been neglected in both approaches. Within the United States, Pacific Islanders have been sometimes subsumed under, or conjoined with, Asian American studies. This has occurred despite a lack of historical connection to Asian Americans and despite how Pacific Islander studies has sought to identify Asian Americans not necessarily as allies but as a part of settler colonialism in Hawai‘i. Meanwhile, in “Asia as method,” the Pacific and Pacific Islanders are invisible because of the focus on those same Asian states that from Pacific Islander perspectives were involved in Pacific warfare, tourism, development, and domination. A transpacific approach places Asian American studies and “Asia as method” in relation to each other and Pacific studies; such an approach also provincializes both American studies as area studies, and area studies itself, which should no longer be considered as a universal (western) approach to a foreign object but should instead be treated as a set of regionally based academic fields that share common objects of study.

Perhaps most importantly, however, transpacific studies both critiques and is a part of institutional, academic power and knowledge production. This institutional embeddedness of the transpacific is manifest in how the term also appears in the TPP and all it signifies about the Pacific as a regional manifestation of globalized interests emerging from both Asian and western nation-states. Transpacific studies is not immune from being captured by the logic of capital that is fundamental to the TPP. Transpacific studies within universities can easily become an academic commodity, or, as an administrative unit, can become critically stagnant, rendered into a bureaucratic arm of the TPP, or outstripped by the passage of time and the development of new political and economic forces. Thus, this book is not a call for the institutionalization of “transpacific studies” inasmuch as it is a call for developing transpacific studies as an analytic that can be used to historicize, contextualize, and illuminate the transpacific circulations of peoples, cultures, commodities, and ideas. What is compelling about transpacific studies is not its capacity to be instrumentalized in an institution, but its potential as a set of theories and methods that can help activate those alternative and dissident intellectual currents produced from Enlightenment thought and resistance movements of anticolonial nationalism and

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minority empowerment. For this reason, we chose to keep “transpacific studies” in lower case letters, to signal its use as a critical vantage point and perspective, rather than as a subdiscipline or department.

### **Transpacific Theories, Methods, and Cases**

What are some of those theories and methods of transpacific studies? As implied above, transpacific studies exists at the juncture of area studies, American studies, and Asian American studies, as they are practiced not only in the United States but elsewhere. Area studies and American studies are traditionally defined by region, nation, and people, and often take those geographical and ethnic boundaries as parameters limiting intellectual inquiry. The idea of the nation or a place is certainly paramount in their self-definition, but within a framework of mobile populations, ideas, and scholars, tendencies in area studies and American studies to remain fixed within national borders seem outdated. In area studies, this attention to locale has gone hand in hand with a stress on deep knowledge, disciplinary focus, and language acquisition. In contrast, American studies places great emphasis on interdisciplinarity as an expression of how American studies sees itself less as an area studies and more as a type of cultural studies. Asian American studies also stresses interdisciplinarity and has traditionally assumed America to be its frame and Asian Americans to be its objects, while prioritizing an oppositional method that has been its prime justification. The ideological orientation of Asian American studies has been its prime justification. Transpacific studies draws from all three of these approaches while focusing less on the limits of a particular place or a people and stressing the movements of people, culture, capital, or ideas within regions and between nations.

Starting from the premise that both sides of the Pacific must be taken into account, as well as the populations, subjectivities, and histories of the ocean in between, transpacific studies acknowledges the importance of American power but stresses the necessity of foregrounding Asia and the Pacific. Hopefully by doing so, transpacific studies can avoid being another imperializing intellectual gesture from the west, wherein an oppositional method also reasserts the dominant subjectivity of western practitioners. The potential certainly exists for such a biased practice of transpacific studies, but the bias is not inherent. Transpacific studies must be conscious of incorporating scholars speaking from different histories, locations, and nations, and any approach that purports to be diasporic, transnational, international, or global must have built into it the possibility of dialogue, contestation, and contradictory, material histories.

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There is urgency, then, for transpacific studies to prioritize Asian and Pacific theories, perspectives, and objects of inquiry. Such prioritization is inseparable from a wider political project about contesting and controlling the production of knowledge, its location in universities that are a part of nation-states, and the enmeshment of those states in colonialism and capitalism.

Today's challenge is to devise institutions that will generate a more complex, subtle knowledge of the world that is mult centered rather than bipolar in perspective. This need for complexity reflects how scholars from every part of the world have come to western universities (as immigrants, refugees, and foreign students), many of them now forming the cutting edge of area studies in the west and in Asia. Thus, world area studies are now domesticated inside the west by the global participation of scholars who take their native regions of cultural difference and experience seriously. At the same time, many western scholars have become partially expatriated by traveling and studying in other countries, which they feel seriously to be home. Global intellectuals from the west and elsewhere move among world regions of cultures and states, but their reputations are built on their knowledge of particular languages, cultures, and histories. Within this framework of mobile populations, ideas, and scholars, current tendencies in area studies and American studies to remain fixed within national borders seem outdated. The study of Asian and Pacific diasporas encourages area studies to examine populations as they move outside of a given nation's borders, and encourages American studies, wherever it is based, to turn toward the Pacific as much as the Atlantic.

Not tied to a nation or a people by the name of a field and its genealogy, transpacific studies pays attention to the equally important way that movement defines and shapes cultures, and vice versa. Transpacific studies builds on a "mobilities" perspective or paradigm that examines how social life gains expressions through the movement of people, things, ideas, and institutions across places and nations (see Urry 2005 and Hannan et al. 2006). Rather than seeing globalization as an all powerful force which inexorably determines the fate of cultures caught in its past, or celebrating the "elite nomadism" of a few cosmopolitan globe-trotters, we use transpacific studies to question how such movements are symbolically and materially produced. The circulation of people, ideas, and capital is not simply a mapping of flows but also of the infrastructure, which enables or resists these flows. The celebration of the age of globalization as a time of openness, fluidity, and transnational flows should not blind us to the fact that it is also characterized by new regulations, constraints, and exploitation. Those lower on the social scale provide the "friction" and the resistance to certain global forces that place them more as victims and displaced

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persons than as cosmopolitans and globe-trotters (see Tsing 2002). The refugee, the domestic laborer migrant, the sweatshop worker may prefer to kick and resist some of these global flows (see Mrazek 2010).

The existence of these less mobile populations and the nations from which they do not move from, or are compelled to flee from, could lead to charges that transpacific studies celebrates prematurely the death or decline of the nation, and fetishizes the idea of flows across the Pacific. Certainly it is the case that nations are not dead or even in real decline. The nation remains both vital and necessary for many even as it is limiting and oppressive. But even though key components of transpacific studies are obviously not about nations, nations and nationalism remain central to transpacific studies. The negotiation in transpacific studies is between the continuing existence and relevance of nations and the movements that cross national boundaries and struggle with the control of nation-states. Transpacific studies proposes that the beginning and ending locations of such movement should both be considered, particularly as they often can be found in segregated fields of study. But while the Americas and Asia comprise two ends of the transpacific, the model is hardly binary, given the importance of these movements across the Pacific and between a variable combination of countries.

Stressing movement in this way could certainly lead to other charges that transpacific studies fetishizes cosmopolitanism and those who can travel, whether they happen to be western or Asian elites. What happens to those who are forced to travel? In the latter instance, transpacific studies focuses on travel in general, not just travel in the sense of a leisurely or capitalistic pursuit. Travel in the broader sense includes forced migration of various degrees of compulsion (such as slaves, indentured laborers, guest-worker programs, economic refugees, adoptees, mail-order brides). Here, “cosmopolitanism” becomes a description of a variety of traveling modes, not just that of the jet-setting elite consumer and capitalist. The migrant worker who must speak two or more languages to survive has cosmopolitan knowledge, of a different type and perhaps greater degree than many First World citizens. Recasting cosmopolitanism to be historically and culturally varied provides new visibility to populations whose travel has not been glamorous or celebrated, like those islanders who explored the Pacific long before Europeans came or those Chinese and Indians who found their way to Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Mexico, Cuba, and many other places before the twentieth century. Transpacific studies emphasizes the importance of crossing the Pacific to so many populations diverse not only in terms of nation, region, language, ethnicity, and religion but also in terms of class and occupation.

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But even if this is the case, what about those who cannot travel? Immobilized populations are arguably the ones who suffer the most neglect in forms of study fixated on diaspora, transnationalism, hybridity, and difference. Peasants and the urban poor have little romance of any kind attached to them in these forms of study, despite the possibility that “it is not the immigrant but the ones who stay behind who are the true unvanquished” (Kumar 225). Still, even for those who stay behind, transpacific movements and the circulation of cultures, ideas, and capital remain important. Remittances, to provide just one example, are one way those who are too poor to leave receive benefits from those who have left. Movies and music are other ways by which the popular culture from other countries circulates into regions where the residents are restricted to seeing the world through their television and DVD player. American studies has not been very concerned with remittances, since they leave the United States and go elsewhere, or with the impact of American cultural forms overseas, particularly if they are created by minority populations. Likewise, in reverse, area studies in Asia has neglected the diasporic populations that send remittances home, or that create high-gloss popular cultural artifacts like music videos, movies, and variety shows that are circulated in countries of origin. Transpacific studies foregrounds both the sending and the receiving of these cultures, peoples, capital, and ideas as they disregard national boundaries and as they move in unpredictable ways.<sup>16</sup> Remittances and cultural products, for example, do not move in a binary fashion between the west and Asia, but between Asian countries as well.

Perhaps most importantly, highly mobilized structures of capital, politics, and power that are transpacific, such as the proposed TPP, help to fix poor and disempowered people in their places. The tension between mobility and fixity is at the heart of transpacific studies as both its analytic and its method. What transpacific studies shows is that those with the capacity to move voluntarily, especially in great numbers, with great force, and over global distances—explorers, conquerors, entrepreneurs, capitalists, the armies and navies of powerful countries—have tremendous power over those who cannot move voluntarily. This kind of power also enables the powerful to move commodities and capital, to move other people as labor, and to move ideas. Transpacific studies is not only the study of this kind of empowered and empowering movement that has been crucial to imperialism, colonialism, and capitalism, it is also the expression of a counterimpulse that has sometimes animated those who are fixed to one place or who are forced to move.

This counterimpulse realizes itself in the desire to build coalitions, alliances, and imaginations among the poor, the oppressed, and the disempowered,

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which would enable them to understand their formation by transpacific histories, to enact their own agency against transpacific forces, and to see themselves as part of transpacific communities. Not least, transpacific studies stresses the fact that academic and intellectual formations are also fixed into place by structures of power. Rigid boundaries of area and discipline help to stabilize academia and create well-demarcated fields of study, but they also hinder academic study from fully understanding those highly mobilized structures of capital, politics, and power. These structures have not only imagined and exploited the transpacific, but have also compartmentalized academic knowledge production in the western university and its westernized counterparts in Asia. In resisting some of these pressures to be contained and fixed in place, transpacific studies is a hopeful intellectual gesture toward a scholarship that can achieve some of the same fluidity as the ocean after which it is named.

The chapters in this volume present a number of different methods and explore a number of ways in which people are linked across the Pacific—through media and culture (Benitez and Sears, Lippit, Lutkehaus), histories of racial divisions and civil war (Kwon, Espiritu), remittances (Thai), multinational corporations (Xiang), migration (Yeoh and Lin, Huang), and imperialism (Rowe). Acknowledging the importance of Asia to a transpacific method, the first three essays in the anthology present transpacific approaches from Asian points of view. Weiqiang Lin and Brenda S. A. Yeoh’s “Transpacific Studies: The View from Asia” provides a subtle and nuanced argument for a transpacific studies that resists American-centric approaches and binary models of East and West (which inevitably privilege the latter). Not surprisingly, they argue, Asia is often dispossessed of any true weight in contemporary theorizing of migration. As far as current models are concerned, Asia’s lot is to be a perpetual secondary migration space, neither having autonomy or attractive power, nor assuming any centrality in transnational processes. They propose more radical interventions in the way Asia, its subjectivities, and its relations with other Pacific players are being approached. By highlighting not just “ethnic” flows originating in, or returning to, Asia, they argue that expanding the empirical scope of transpacific studies to include, say, “American diasporas” can moderate tendencies to reify ideas about, and dichotomies between, immigrant/receiving societies and emigrant/sending countries. More can be said as well about the similarities, rather than differences, that Asian migrants share with other (especially “white”) itinerants. Finally, transpacific connections need to be situated within a larger context of global and supraregional flows. The multiple ways in which Asia has historically been wedded to other regions and economies are indicative of the fact that transpacific linkages constitute only one of *many* transnational orders in the world.

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These transnational orders, and the relations between Asia and the United States, were indelibly shaped by the event addressed in Heonik Kwon's "The Transpacific Cold War." He assesses the radically different manifestation of the global Cold War between the transatlantic and the transpacific historical horizon: between Europe's Cold War which was largely a nonviolent "imaginary war" of economic competition and military alliance, and the postcolonial Cold War experienced in the Asia-Pacific which was far from an imaginary war, involving instead vicious civil wars and other exceptional forms of political violence. Transpacific Cold War history, he argues, has to be understood in the context of a particular colonial history experienced in the Asia-Pacific region that involved Asian as well as European imperial powers, and also in relation to the revolutionary anticolonial and postcolonial struggles that permeated the region in the twentieth century. Examining some of the central assumptions in contemporary Cold War historical scholarship and postcolonial historical and cultural studies, the essay objects to the prevailing transatlantic centrality in the interpretation of the global Cold War and questions why contemporary postcolonial scholarship displaces Cold War history from its descriptive and analytical contours. Kwon explores these questions, in part, with illustrations drawn from the history of migration and contemporary social development in southern Vietnam and South Korea, two major sites of global bipolar conflict.

The contemporary conflicts in that region have much to do with the rise of China, and Xiang Biao's "The Pacific Paradox: The Chinese State in Transpacific Interactions" turns our attention to that country. The "Pacific paradox" is Xiang's model for understanding how the Pacific is at once structurally integrated and fundamentally divided. Xiang argues that the Chinese public view is that China *has to* compete with the United States in order to survive, and in order to do that, China *has to* become like the United States in developing capitalism and building up military might. Global capitalism is such that China's economic and social life must be integrated into the world in order to survive and prosper, but at the same time, real geopolitics is such that the United States is inevitably hostile to China regardless of what China does. Tensions between China and the United States do not stem from their differences but their similarities; they are not too far apart, but instead too tightly connected. Xiang also offers a model of "neostatism" for understanding how the Chinese state works. Neostatism emerged as part of, instead of prior to, the Pacific paradox and is a result of the intensification of transpacific exchanges. Neostatism sees the state as the primary and unquestionable *frame* within which society should be organized, and as such the state serves as a central referent in making sense of the world.

The next essays shift to the broad question of how cultures are shaped by transpacific circulation and are themselves constituents of such circulation. In

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“Miguel Covarrubias and the Pageant of the Pacific: The Golden Gate International Exposition and the Idea of the Transpacific, 1939–1940,” Nancy Lutkehaus examines how “The Pageant of the Pacific” was perceived and constructed through a series of murals painted by the Mexican artist Miguel Covarrubias for the San Francisco Exposition in 1939. He developed a way of visually representing the connectedness of societies on either side of the Pacific through illustrated maps, elaborating his earlier fascination with islands like Bali into a utopian canvas of many islands and continents joined by peaceful trade and cooperation. As a dark-skinned “native” of a nation under heavy American influence, he was believed to have natural empathy and “sympathetic understanding of the peoples and lands of the Pacific Basin.” Covarrubias’s maps were the first ever to put the Pacific Ocean in the middle, with the countries of Asia and the Americas on the sides, so that Europe, Africa, and the Middle East were cut out. This innovation was tied to a “re-orienting” he already saw as imminent with Europe’s slide into a “suicidal war” which would push the Pacific area into a more prominent role in global leadership. By late 1941, with the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, his prophetic vision began to be realized.

John Carlos Rowe’s “Transpacific Studies and the Cultures of U.S. Imperialism” focuses on the disciplinary role transpacific studies should play in the new American studies with its emphasis on comparative study of the Americas. In this context, he addresses where the many different communities of the Pacific belong in the ongoing study of U.S. imperialism and neoimperialism in this crucial contact zone of the Americas. He locates the efforts by formerly colonized states to achieve cultural, economic, and political sovereignty in their relation to the Pacific region both as a geographical area and as a site for a series of commercial, military, and cultural routes, especially those of the United States. He argues that what Chalmers Johnson has termed the U.S. “empire of bases” needs to be expanded to include specific studies of the Mariana Islands (Guam, Saipan, Tinian, et al.), American Samoa, and other U.S. military bases in the Pacific and Asia that serve the larger colonial purposes of the U.S. military. The U.S. military presence has also had a crucial environmental impact that is a neglected issue in transpacific studies. He discusses some of the infamous cases of nuclear pollution on Bikini (Bikini) Atoll and military construction on Wake Island as examples of the environmental concerns raised by indigenous populations, especially those groups organized to achieve their sovereignty and independence from U.S. spheres of economic, political, and military influence.

J. Francisco Benitez and Laurie J. Sears also take on the question of U.S. imperialism and its impact on academic and cultural formations. In “Passionate Attachments to Area Studies and Asian American Studies: Subjectivity and

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Diaspora in the Transpacific,” they explore racial subjectivity through a methodology of “critical melancholia,” examining the intersection of various forms of social inequality and how these forms have been problematized in area and ethnic studies. Ethnic studies and area studies are both affected by similar “enigmatic signifiers” or traces left by U.S. imperial desires. Both academic fields have had fraught and complex relations with U.S. nation- and empire-building. They ask: How are U.S. area studies changing in the face of these challenges? How has the return of the (repressed) awareness of the United States as an empire affected ethnic studies’ long-standing but often forgotten critique of American exceptionalism? How are interdisciplinary and disciplinary methodologies adapting to these changes? Conversations between area studies and ethnic studies are opening up as the diasporic and cosmopolitan routes of travel put more and more subjects in motion, and the insights from each field unsettle the other. To understand how diasporic communities and narrations destabilize the notion of “home” and foreground the “unhomed” or the “multihomed” as conditions of everyday life, they focus on Philippine American author Jessica Hagedorn’s and Indonesian author Ayu Utami’s novels, whose characters travel back and forth between and within Asian and American imperial formations.

Akira Lippit turns to transpacific cultural circulation within Asia and, to a lesser extent, between Asia and the west, in order to look at the relationship between nationalism, cinema, and language. On the one hand, strong national cinemas in the Chinas, Japan, and South Korea emerged or resurged at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first. On the other hand, this resurgence marked the appearance of an Asia and of Asian cinemas no longer formed according to the protocols of the nation, nor entirely apart from the specters of the nation. He argues that national cinemas are always complicit in the forms of nationalism that they sustain and determine. They reflect the nation that they enact, reflections caused by and that cause the appearance of the nation. Nations not only appear in the moments, they are themselves appearances, images. Nations are phantasms, fantastic inventions, or imagined communities, as Benedict Anderson says, which is to say they form and are formed by images. Imagined, imaginary, national cinemas lead to what Lippit calls an imaginal cinema and imaginalism. These concepts allow him to interrogate the relationship between language and nationalism via cinematic form, where national languages are also imaginary languages. What sort of languages these are, and what happens when these languages that sustain national identities are infiltrated, hybridized, contaminated, or translated are questions he explores in regards to contemporary East Asian cinema.

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The next set of essays look at transpacific populations that move voluntarily or involuntarily across the Pacific. In “Militarized Refuge: A Critical Re-reading of Vietnamese Flight to the United States,” Yên Lê Espiritu examines the role of the United States in “rescuing” Vietnamese refugees at the end of the Vietnam War. She challenges the “rescue and liberation” narrative of what has been dubbed “the largest humanitarian airlift in history” by exposing the militarized nature of the U.S. refugee resettlement effort. U.S. evacuation efforts were not a slapdash response to an emergency situation that arose in Vietnam in 1975, but rather were part of militarized histories and circuits dating back to 1898. Espiritu traces the most-traveled refugee route via military aircraft—from Vietnam to the Philippines to Guam and then to California, all of which routed the refugees through U.S. military bases—as a critical lens through which to map, both discursively and materially, the transpacific displacement brought about by the legacy of U.S. colonial and military expansion into the Asia Pacific region. She makes two related arguments: the first about military colonialism, which contends that it is the region’s (neo)colonial dependence on the United States that turned the Philippines and Guam into the “ideal” receiving centers of U.S. rescuing project; and the second about militarized refuge, which emphasizes the mutually constitutive nature of the concepts “refugees” and “refuge” and shows how both emerge out of, and in turn bolster, U.S. militarism.

The circulation of migrants is at least as varied as the circulation of capital. Hung Cam Thai, in “Special Money in the Vietnamese Diaspora,” traces one financial trail between Vietnam and its diasporic populations. He focuses on the relationship between remittances and return visits among low-wage Vietnamese immigrants living in various parts of the diaspora. Remittances have become an institutional dimension of contemporary Vietnamese society, especially in Saigon, where consumption and remittances are the highest in the country. Remittances play a key role in improving the daily lives of family members in the homeland. His article addresses the cultural and moral meanings that surround monetary transactions between those who receive and those who send money across international borders. Money is social in nature and culturally specific, embedded in relations of power, interacting with differences in gender, class, and generations. Money received from inheritances or a wedding, for example, falls in the category of “special money,” that is, money that has social and cultural significance in its use. He suggests that remittances in the Vietnamese context are special money, designated for specific purposes and having different meanings for senders and receivers. Thus, when this special money is used beyond the boundaries of its purpose, which overseas Vietnamese often understand only by returning to Vietnam to see how their money is spent, tensions are often created in transnational family ties.

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Finally, in the conclusion, we turn to a scholar who pioneered the idea of transpacific studies, and who has crossed borders both autobiographically and as a writer. In “Living Transpacifically,” Yunte Huang blends memoir and criticism to recall his years of growing up in China, an experience profoundly shaped by the currents of transpacific flows, cross-cultural exchanges as intangible as radio signals, or as real as blood-soaked pages of pirated foreign books. His narrative leads to Tiananmen Square and then migration to the United States, where he would pen two books on the transpacific. The field of transpacific studies that he named provides a new perspective on the connections and linkages that span an ocean, and tries to both recognize and address inequities in knowledge production between scholars situated in different geographic locations and in different disciplines.

This volume tries to define some of the parameters of this new field of transpacific studies in order to awaken scholars to the shifting tides of the world’s greatest ocean, which now unite widely dispersed populations and forge new connections in both the imagination and the material world. In undertaking this enterprise, the editors realize that this volume is far from sufficient in its coverage. Canada, New Zealand, and Australia are all absent, even though they each have transpacific connections. Latin America, with its centuries-long history of what Evelyn Hu-deHart calls the “Spanish Pacific,” is only gestured at here. The complexities of the Pacific Islands are not sufficiently reflected in the coverage that is present, and the voices of Pacific Islanders are not represented. The pre-twentieth century histories of the Pacific and the powers and peoples involved in it are in the background of a collection that focuses on the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In fact, the editing of the volume has been a humbling reminder of how much more the volume undoubtedly excludes rather than includes. At the same time, our awareness of how much more could be and needs to be addressed convinces us of the necessity for continuing work in transpacific studies.

### Notes to Introduction: Transpacific Studies: Critical Perspectives on an Emerging Field

1. See Matsuda (2012) for a concise history of the Pacific, including both its island populations and the various ages of exploration, imperialism, and colonialism conducted by Asian, European, and American nations. He offers the useful model of translocalism for understanding the histories of the Pacific.

2. See Dirlik (1998) for a summary of the discourses around the Pacific.

3. See Lim et al. (2012) on the details of the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership.

4. For more on how European thinkers including Adam Smith, Hegel, and Lenin imagined Asia—from the “starting point of history” to a “progressive Asia” that contrasted with a “backward Europe”—see Wang (2011).

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5. See Lutkehaus's essay in this volume for a discussion of how new maps were drawn around the Pacific in the 1930s.

6. See Johnson (2004) for a critique of the United States as an imperial force in the era of globalization.

7. Edwards (2003), Mullen (2004), Prashad (2002), and Von Eschen (1997) elaborate on all these examples.

8. For a particularly affecting account of such ghosts, see Cho (2008).

9. The notion of the subimperial comes from Chen (2010) and is elaborated on in Lee (2009).

10. Notes one American helicopter pilot: "The Koreans had sent out their Tiger teams. They came back with mortar tubes, base plates, and severed VC heads. The Koreans also complained that our gunships had killed some of their men. We came off as a bunch of amateurs compared to the ROKs" (Mason 1982, 198). This American perception of Korean soldiers being as tough or tougher than Americans was not unusual. Vietnamese perception interpreted that toughness differently. The memoirist Le Ly Hayslip (1990) writes: "More dangerous [than the Americans] were the Koreans who now patrolled the American sector. Because a child from our village once walked into their camp and exploded a Viet Cong bomb wired to his body, the Koreans took terrible retribution against the children themselves (whom they saw simply as little Viet Cong). After the incident, some Korean soldiers went to a school, snatched up some boys, threw them into a well, and tossed a grenade in afterward as an example to the others. To the villagers, these Koreans were like the Moroccans [who helped the French]—tougher and meaner than the white soldiers they supported. Like the Japanese of World War II, they seemed to have no conscience and went about their duties as ruthless killing machines. No wonder they found my country a perfect place to ply their terrible trade" (198). As Heonik Kwon (2006) notes, this behavior by South Korean troops was hardly surprising, when their campaign slogans included "kill clean, burn clean, destroy clean," "anything you see is all Vietcong," "children also spy," and "better to make mistakes than to miss" (29).

11. Their focus is limited to the triangular power-sharing arrangements of the United States, Japan, and an aspiring South Korea, whereas the "transpacific imaginary," as first coined by Huang (2002) and dwelt on by Mayer and Kunneman (2009), dealt with China. All these works suggest the possibility that the transpacific extends beyond binary relationships between particular, antagonistic, or collaborative countries, and enrich Sakai and Yoo's (2012) insight into "transpacific complicity," which is certainly more extensive than only the relationship between Japan and the United States.

12. See Miyoshi (1993) and Harootunian (2002) for critiques of area studies, and Szanton (2004) for a defense of area studies.

13. See L. Lowe (2012) for another perspective on how transpacific concerns are reshaping Asian American studies, and Nguyen (2012) for a more detailed elaboration of the limits of Asian American studies in the international context.

14. Wang's (2011) arguments for reimagining Asia, for example, generally assume that Asia is defined first and foremost through China and Japan, while Sakai and Yoo's (2012) model of the transpacific adds Korea to these two countries.

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15. We thank Chih-ming Wang for reminding us of the influence of Chen's work, including the Inter-Asia Cultural Studies project that he spearheaded.

16. Levitt (2007) has argued forcefully that transpacific flows are very important to "those who are left behind," as both sources of income and of circulating cultural inspirations and aspirations (6).

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